



GHWP

# Global Harmonization Working Party

Towards Medical Device Harmonization

## PROPOSED DOCUMENT

**Title:** Definition and Classification of Field Corrective Actions, including Field Safety Corrective Actions, Recalls and Non-Safety related Field Corrective Actions

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## 33 **Foreword**

34 This GHWP Document was developed by Global Harmonization Working Party (GHWP) Work  
35 Group 4 (Post-market). GHWP is a voluntary group of representatives from medical device  
36 regulatory authorities and the medical device industry. The document is intended to provide  
37 non-binding guidance for use in the regulation of medical devices, and subject to consultation  
38 throughout its development process.

39 This GHWP Document shall be read in conjunction with the current laws and regulations used  
40 in member economies.

41 Any statements or references from external sources are used under appropriate citations as  
42 specified in the normative references and bibliography.

43 There are no restrictions on the reproduction, distribution, translation or use of this document.  
44 However, incorporation of this document, in part or in whole, into any other document does  
45 not convey or represent an endorsement of any kind by the Global Harmonization Working  
46 Party.

47 In this GHWP Document, the following verbal forms are used:

- 48 — “shall” indicates a requirement;
- 49 — “should” indicates a recommendation;
- 50 — “may” indicates a permission; and
- 51 — “can” indicates a possibility or a capability.

52 This document cancels and replaces AHWP/WG2/F002:2012, Definition and Classification of  
53 Field Corrective Actions, including Field Safety Corrective Actions, Recalls and Non Safety  
54 related Field Corrective Actions.

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## 57 **1 Scope**

58 This document, developed by Work Group 4 of GHWP, provides comprehensive guidance  
59 and information on Field Safety Corrective Actions and Non-Safety related Field  
60 Corrective Actions for marketed medical devices. It outlines key concepts, definitions, and  
61 classifications that are essential for understanding and managing these actions.

## 62 **2 Normative References**

63 There are no normative references in this document.

## 64 **3 Terms and Definitions**

### 65 **3.1 Field Corrective Action (FCA)**

66 A Field Corrective Action is a measure implemented to address the root cause and  
67 prevent the recurrence of an undesirable situation in a marketed medical device. It  
68 may be categorized as either a Field Safety Corrective Action or a Non-Safety  
69 related Field Corrective Action.

### 70 **3.2 Field Safety Corrective Action (FSCA)**

71 A Field Safety Corrective Action (FSCA) is any remedial action, including preventive  
72 and corrective measures, taken by a manufacturer to reduce the risk of death or  
73 serious deterioration in the state of health associated with the use of a medical  
74 device. This action can include product recalls, device modifications, implant alerts,  
75 device precautions, and user warnings.

76 Five types of FSCA are listed below. Related examples are provided in **Annex A**.

#### 77 **3.2.1 Device Recall**

78 The permanent removal from the market and / or destruction of devices,  
79 when the device has or may have a safety problem.

#### 80 **3.2.2 Device Modification**

81 The repair, modification or adjustment of the device (including software  
82 update) or the label and / or instructions for use when the device has or

83 could cause a safety problem. The corrective action may take place at the  
84 users' or the manufacturer's premises or any other agreed upon location.

### 85 **3.2.3 Implant Alert**

86 The issuing of precautionary information about a device where the affected  
87 devices are already implanted.

### 88 **3.2.4 Device Precaution**

89 The issuing of information and precautionary measures about adverse  
90 events with a medical device where neither the root cause nor their  
91 resolution has been established but it is likely that follow up action will be  
92 necessary.

### 93 **3.2.5 User Warning**

94 The issuing of information which would warn of a potential patient safety  
95 risk that may arise from procedural or medical device use.

## 96 **3.3 Non-Safety related Field Corrective Action (NSFCA)**

97 A Non-Safety related Field Corrective Action (NSFCA) is any corrective action taken  
98 by the manufacturer for reasons other than reducing the risk of death or serious  
99 deterioration in the state of health associated with the use of a medical device.

100 The three types of NSFCA are listed below. Related examples are presented in  
101 **Annex B.**

### 102 **3.3.1 Device Withdrawal**

103 The removal of a product from supply and use when the medical device  
104 does not pose a safety problem.

### 105 **3.3.2 Device Enhancement**

106 The enhancement or upgrade that improves the features and performance  
107 of a medical device that is not related to safety reasons.

### 108 **3.3.3 Stock Recovery**

109                   The correction or removal from supply of a device that has not been  
110                   marketed or that has not left the direct control of the manufacturer.

## 111   **4   Classification of FCAs**

112           Classifications are proposed by the manufacturer to identify the level of risk posed to  
113           patients, users and others, and if the device is continued to be used. The classification  
114           of FCA can be based on a risk assessment that considers the potential impact on patient  
115           safety and clinical outcomes. It facilitates manufacturers, regulatory authorities and  
116           healthcare providers to prioritize FCA in their management plan. Proper classification  
117           ensures that the most critical issues are addressed promptly to mitigate any adverse  
118           health outcomes. The classification is divided into three classes, which are listed below,  
119           with examples provided in **Annex C**.

### 120   **4.1   Class 1**

121           A field corrective action taken by the manufacturer when death or serious  
122           deterioration in the state of health of a patient, user or other person has occurred or  
123           there is a reasonable probability that exposure to or use of the violative medical  
124           device(s) can lead to death or serious deterioration in the state of health of a patient,  
125           user or other person.

### 126   **4.2   Class 2**

127           A field corrective action taken by the manufacturer when there is a reasonable  
128           probability that the exposure or use of the violative medical device(s) has or can  
129           lead to temporary illness, injury, mistreatment or deterioration of the state of health  
130           of a patient, user or other person.

### 131   **4.3   Class 3**

132           A field corrective action taken by the manufacturer when there is a reasonable  
133           probability that the exposure or use of the violative medical device will not lead to  
134           temporary illness, injury, mistreatment or deterioration of the state of health of a  
135           patient, user or other person.

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## Annex A

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### Examples of Field Safety Corrective Action (FSCA)

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#### Type 1 – Device Recall

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**The permanent removal from the market and / or destruction of devices, when the device has or may have a safety problem.**

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#### Example 1

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Following a report concerning a nurse being contaminated by a chemotherapy agent, an investigation by the manufacturer into adverse event reports about the splitting of the barrel of syringes used to inject cytotoxic chemotherapy drugs determines that the root cause was a manufacturing error and that batches manufactured between certain dates are affected. To prevent potential unintended exposure to chemotherapy or other harm caused by the use of a defective syringe, the manufacturer contacts all distributors and users who received syringes from the affected batches, requesting either their return for disposal by the manufacturer or documentation of disposal by the distributors or users. Batches outside of the range identified are not affected and can be used or supplied. **The permanent removal or destruction of the potentially faulty syringes from the market for safety reasons makes this action an FSCA Type 1.**

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#### Example 2

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The manufacturer has received reports about catheter balloons bursting during procedures to remove blood clots from patients' arteries. An investigation by the manufacturer reveals that the material and design used for these balloon catheters is the same as for those used to inflate coronary artery stents and that the medical device may not be appropriate for use in removing blood clots. The manufacturer has decided that all balloon catheters intended to be used for removal of blood clots and have this design and material must be returned to them even though this same design and material is considered to be safe when used for coronary arteries stenting. **The permanent removal of this medical device model for safety reasons makes this action a FSCA Type 1.**

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#### Example 3



168 The manufacturer of an in-vitro testing device receives reports that the software error  
169 results in false positives to the test. Based on these inaccurate test results, the patients  
170 received unnecessary treatment associated with significant toxicity. Reports were also  
171 received of false negative test results, which delayed treatment until the patient  
172 became symptomatic. The manufacturer determined that a software modification will  
173 not resolve the inaccurate test results, so requested all laboratories using the device  
174 to return all units. **The permanent removal or destruction of a device for safety**  
175 **reasons makes this action an FSCA Type 1.**

## 176 **Type 2 – Device Modification**

177 **The repair, modification, or adjustment of the device or the label and / or**  
178 **instructions for use when the device has or could cause a safety problem. The**  
179 **corrective action may take place at the users' or the manufacturer's premises or**  
180 **any other agreed upon location.**

### 181 Example 1

182 Patient was misdiagnosed because images from a CT scan were mislabeled. During  
183 the investigation of the event, the manufacturer discovered that the cause was user  
184 error that could be mitigated by a software correction. A “software patch” was delivered  
185 to all users of the system with instructions for imaging technicians at the radiology  
186 centers on how to install and validate the “software patch” – users of the system were  
187 also given the option for a manufacturer’s service agent to install the service pack. **The**  
188 **act of providing a software patch or service upgrade for safety reasons makes**  
189 **this an FSCA Type 2.**

### 190 Example 2

191 A number of adverse events with a negative pressure wound therapy device have been  
192 reported to the manufacturer. The instructions for use were missing or did not include  
193 warnings against use of this device on patients with particular medical conditions. The  
194 manufacturer has added the additional warnings to the instructions for use and sent  
195 out a new version to all users to replace the original instructions for use. **The act of**  
196 **providing additions to or replacement versions of instructions for use for safety**  
197 **reasons, even if replaced by the user, makes this an FSCA Type 2.**

### 198 Example 3

199 A manufacturer received multiple reports of inadvertent activation of an insulin pump  
200 during patient movement which could result in inappropriate drug delivery. The  
201 manufacturer sent all users a protecting ring to be placed around the device activation  
202 switch, to prevent accidental activation. **Medical device replacement or changes**  
203 **which offer improvements to performance for safety reasons, even if replaced**  
204 **by the user, makes this an FSCA Type 2.**

### 205 **Type 3 – Implant Alert**

206 **The issuing of precautionary information about a device where the affected devices**  
207 **are already implanted.**

#### 208 Example 1

209 A manufacturer discovers that certain models of a specific pacemaker may reach their  
210 end of life prematurely. The investigation finds the cause to be related to the reliability  
211 of an electrical component. The manufacturer issues an advisory to implanting  
212 surgeons and cardiologists to counsel and to follow those implanted patients at more  
213 regular intervals and only replace devices as appropriate. **The act of communicating**  
214 **a problem about an implantable device and providing information about patient**  
215 **follow up or elective device replacement makes this an FSCA Type 3.**

#### 216 Example 2

217 An increasing number of adverse events involving surgical mesh implanted into the  
218 bladder for problems with urinary incontinence have been received by the  
219 manufacturer. The meshes have eroded into surrounding tissues and the patients  
220 continue to experience severe pain and incontinence. Due to the extent of the internal  
221 damage, it is not known if the mesh can be safely removed without further serious  
222 injury. The manufacturer issues a labelling update, notifying physicians about the  
223 situation and advising them to communicate to the patient prior to implantation  
224 regarding the increase in known adverse events and the need to monitor patients who  
225 have the mesh already implanted. **The act of communicating to physicians about**  
226 **potential problems with implants makes this an FSCA Type 3.**

### 227 **Type 4 – Device Precaution**

228 **The issuing of information and precautionary measures about adverse events with**  
229 **a medical device where neither the root cause nor their resolution has been**  
230 **established but it is likely that follow up action will be necessary.**

231 Example 1

232 The manufacturer has received reports about the failure of a particular model of  
233 anesthetic machine when operated in a certain mode. The manufacturer is still  
234 investigating this particular problem and its potential corrective actions. There are few  
235 alternative methods of delivering anesthetic available. The manufacturer decides to  
236 inform users of this problem and advise them that this mode should not be used until  
237 they have determined the solution to the problem. Once a cause and corrective  
238 solution has been found, further information will be distributed to users. Based on the  
239 progress in the investigation, the manufacturer may take additional FSCA. **Notifying**  
240 **users of a problem without a known resolution while continuing to investigate**  
241 **makes this an FSCA Type 4.**

242 **Type 5 – User Warning**

243 **The issuing of information which would warn of a potential patient safety risk that**  
244 **may arise from procedural or medical device use.**

245 Example 1

246 A number of adverse events with a thermal ligature sealer have been reported to the  
247 manufacturer. The investigation revealed that surgical drapes and/or patients have  
248 been burned. Further information revealed the user had placed the ligature sealer  
249 down on the drapes during the procedure. Placing the ligature sealer on the drapes is  
250 contrary to the instructions for use. A notice was sent to all known users of ligature  
251 sealers stressing the need to place the sealer in a proper holder instead of on the  
252 surgical drapes because of the potential for burns. **The act of sending out a user**  
253 **warning reminder to prevent a safety issue, even though there had been no**  
254 **medical device fault, makes this an FSCA Type 5.**

255 Example 2

256 The manufacturer has been notified of instances where an In-Vitro Diagnostic Device  
257 (IVDD) kit for HIV has been used for diagnosis instead of its intended purpose of  
258 screening. The manufacturer issued a reminder notice to pathology laboratories and

259 physicians that the IVDD kit was not specifically developed for a definitive diagnosis of  
260 HIV. The instructions for use state that this IVDD kit is for screening purposes only and  
261 that it should not be used as a confirmatory test. Patients may be incorrectly diagnosed  
262 and treated with drugs that have serious side effects. **Notifying the user of the**  
263 **medical device's limitations and usage to avoid an incorrect diagnosis makes**  
264 **this an FSCA Type 5.**

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## Annex B

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### Examples of Non-Safety Field Corrective Action (NSFCA)

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#### Type 1 – Device Withdrawal

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The removal of a medical device from supply and use when the medical device does not pose a safety problem.

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#### Example 1

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A manufacturer terminates the sale and distribution of a prepared plated media (PPM) line that tests for methicillin resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* because they recently received approval to market an automated rapid instrument system which will replace the current PPM line. This line will be exchanged or replaced by a newer version.

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**Because this medical device change does not raise safety issues, the event is a Non-Safety related Field Corrective Action Type 1.**

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#### Example 2

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A manufacturer decides to remove a range of wound care medical devices that are not as widely used as a similar medical device due to a business and marketing decision. Safety and liability were not factors in the decision. The medical devices are removed from the shelves and may or may not be replaced with other similar medical devices.

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**Medical device removal due solely to a business decision is a Non-Safety related Field Corrective Action Type 1.**

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#### Example 3

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A manufacturer decides to remove a batch of thermometer probe covers from customer's shelves because of complaints that the covers are sticking together preventing their use. The covers are removed and replaced with covers from a different batch. **Medical device removed due to a quality complaint, that would not pose a safety problem is a Non-Safety related Field Corrective Action Type 1.**

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#### Type 2 – Device Enhancement

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The enhancement or upgrade that improves the features and performance of a medical device that is not related to safety reasons.

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295 Example 1

296 The manufacturer of a CT scanner has developed a software add-on that will enable  
297 the user to perform additional functions. The manufacturer sends the software add-on  
298 with updated instructions for use to the healthcare facility for their technicians to load  
299 onto the scanner or offers to send one of their technicians to the facility to load the  
300 software. **Enhancements to the functionality of medical devices where there are  
301 no improvements indicated by safety issues are Non-Safety related Field  
302 Corrective Action Type 2.**

303 Example 2

304 The manufacturer discontinues an In-Vitro Diagnostic Device (IVDD) line and replaces  
305 it with one in which controls are now supplied in a single-use only vial, offering better  
306 stability and better Quality Control. The old IVDD will still be supplied until stock  
307 depletion. **Replacement or changes to medical devices which offer improvements  
308 to performance are Non-Safety related Field Corrective Action Type 2.**

309 **Type 3 – Stock Recovery**

310 **The correction or removal from supply of a device that has not been marketed or  
311 that has not left the direct control of the manufacturer.**

312 Example 1

313 A manufacturer discovers that due to a manufacturing error on one lot, only one of the  
314 two tools is included in a surgical kit. The manufacturer adds the missing tool in the  
315 instrument trays within their own manufacturing and distribution location sites before  
316 the device is placed on the market. **Error corrections for medical devices that have  
317 not left the manufacturer's control are Non-Safety related Field Corrective Action  
318 Type 3.**

319 Example 2

320 The manufacturer has identified that incorrect power is labeled on a lot of Intraocular  
321 Lenses (IOLs). The lot is contained within the company manufacturing and distribution  
322 sites. The entire lot is quarantined by the manufacturer prior to release into the market.  
323 **Error corrections that have not left the manufacturer's control are Non-Safety  
324 related Field Corrective Action Type 3.**

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## Annex C

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### Examples of Classification of Field Corrective Actions

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The initial classification of notifiable FCAs is proposed by the manufacturer based on information available which is accepted by the National Competent Authority (NCA).

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Should new information become available, the classification may be adjusted. When an

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FCA includes multiple corrective actions with different classification of risks, the actions

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associated with the highest level of risk takes precedence.

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#### **Class 1**

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**A field corrective action taken by the manufacturer when death or serious**

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**deterioration in the state of health of a patient, user or other person has happened**

335

**or there is a reasonable probability that exposure to or use of the medical device(s)**

336

**can lead to death or serious deterioration in the state of health of a patient, user or**

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**other person.**

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#### Example 1 – Implant Alert

339

An increasing number of adverse events involving surgical mesh implanted into the

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bladder for problems with urinary incontinence have been received by the

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manufacturer. The meshes have eroded into surrounding tissues and the patients

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continue to experience severe pain and incontinence. Due to the extent of the internal

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damage, it is not known if the mesh can be safely removed without further serious

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injury. The manufacturer issues a labeling update, notifying physicians about the

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situation and advising them to communicate to the patient prior to implantation

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regarding the increase in known adverse events and the need to monitor patients who

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have the mesh already implanted.

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**Rationale: Due to the inability to remove the surgical mesh, patients have**

349

**suffered or can suffer a serious deterioration in their state of health, making this**

350

**a Class 1 FCA.**

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352 Example 2 – Device Modification

353 A manufacturer received multiple reports of inadvertent activation of an insulin pump  
354 during patient movement which could result in inappropriate drug delivery. The  
355 manufacturer sent all users a protecting ring to be placed around the device activation  
356 switch, to prevent accidental activation.

357 **Rationale: Inappropriate drug delivery of insulin to patients can lead to death or**  
358 **serious deterioration of health of the patient making this a Class 1 FCA.**

359 **Class 2**

360 **A field corrective action taken by the manufacturer when there is a reasonable**  
361 **probability that the exposure or use of the medical device(s) has or can lead to**  
362 **temporary illness, injury, mistreatment or deterioration of the state of health of a**  
363 **patient, user or other person.**

364 Example 1 – User Warning

365 A number of adverse events with a thermal ligature sealer have been reported to the  
366 manufacturer. The investigation revealed that surgical drapes and/or patients have  
367 been burned. Further information revealed the user had placed the ligature sealer  
368 down on the drapes during the procedure. Placing the ligature sealer on the drapes is  
369 contrary to the instructions for use. A notice was sent to all known users of ligature  
370 sealers stressing the need to place the sealer in a proper holder instead of on the  
371 surgical drapes because of the potential for burns.

372 **Rationale: Due to the instructions not being followed, there is possibility of**  
373 **temporary injury to patients or users, making this a Class 2 FCA.**

374 Example 2 – Device Removal

375 Following a report concerning a nurse being contaminated by a chemotherapy agent,  
376 an investigation by the manufacturer into adverse event reports about the splitting of  
377 the barrel of syringes used to inject cytotoxic chemotherapy drugs determines that the  
378 root cause was a manufacturing error and that batches manufactured between certain  
379 dates are affected. To prevent potential unintended exposure to chemotherapy or other  
380 harm caused by the use of a defective syringe, the manufacturer contacts all  
381 distributors and users who received syringes from the affected batches, requesting



382 their return for disposal by the manufacturer or documentation of disposal by the  
383 distributors or users. Batches outside of the range identified are not affected and can  
384 be used or supplied.

385 **Rationale: The unintended exposure to cytotoxic drugs can lead to temporary**  
386 **injury or deterioration in state of health of patient or user making this a Class 2**  
387 **FCA.**

### 388 **Class 3**

389 **A field corrective action taken by the manufacturer when there is a reasonable**  
390 **probability that the exposure or use of the medical device will not lead to temporary**  
391 **illness, injury, mistreatment or deterioration of the state of health of a patient, user**  
392 **or other person.**

#### 393 Example 1 – Device Enhancement

394 The manufacturer discontinues an In-Vitro Diagnostic Device (IVDD) line and replaces  
395 it with one in which controls are now supplied in a single-use only vial, offering better  
396 stability and better quality control. The old IVDD will still be supplied until stock  
397 depletion.

398 **Rationale: It is unlikely that injury, illness or deterioration in the patient's health**  
399 **will occur as a result of continued use of the old IVDD making this a Class 3 FCA.**

#### 400 Example 2 – Stock Recovery

401 A manufacturer discovers that due to a manufacturing error on one lot, only one of the  
402 two tools is included in a surgical kit. The manufacturer adds the missing tool in the  
403 instrument trays within their own manufacturing and distribution location sites before  
404 the device is placed on the market.

405 **Rationale: This is unlikely to cause any injury or deterioration in the state of**  
406 **health of the patient as the correction is being taken before the device is used**  
407 **making this a Class 3 FCA.**

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415 Dissemination Criteria, Procedures and Form

416

417